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A B S T R A C T
This paper advances scholarly debate on the contradictions of environmental risk management
measures by analyzing the determinants of ﬂood insurance coverage among a sample of 403
residents in New Orleans, a city undergoing rapid transformation due to post-Katrina rebuilding
eﬀorts and anthropogenic modiﬁcations of climate, hydrology, and ecology. The paper focuses on
several predictors including subjective ﬂood risk perception, trust in government oﬃcials, so-
ciodemographic characteristics, and experience with ﬂood damage. Using binary logistic re-
gression, the results show that the likelihood of having ﬂood insurance coverage is associated
with past ﬂood damage and socioeconomic status. Older people (over age 65) are more likely to
have ﬂood insurance than younger residents. Race, gender, trust, and perceived ﬂood risk are not
statistically signiﬁcant predictors of ﬂood insurance. We connect our ﬁndings to the paradoxes
and conﬂictual dynamics of ﬂood insurance, a major risk mitigation measure. As we point out, in
ﬂood-prone cities like New Orleans, ﬂood insurance operates as a double whammy: uninsured or
underinsured homes face pervasive risk of both ﬂooding and rising insurance premiums under
the conditions of global climate change.
1. Introduction
Flood hazards are a serious threat to human life, community well-being, and property. The number and scope of those aﬀected
globally by ﬂood hazards are expected to increase due to intensiﬁed real estate development in ﬂood prone areas and increased
frequency and destructive of hurricanes due to rising sea-levels and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Das et al., 2013; Government
Accountability Oﬃce, 2019; Winsemius et al., 2016). Flooding is not just conﬁned to high-risk areas. Rather, according to the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), ﬂoods–that is ﬂash ﬂoods, inland ﬂooding, and ﬂooding from seasonal storms–occur across
the United States. In fact, 90 percent of weather-related disasters in the U.S. involve some type of ﬂooding. Moreover, 20 percent of
all ﬂood claims are ﬁled in low to moderate ﬂood risk areas. In addition, ﬂoods account for the highest number of lives lost and most
property damages from natural hazards (Kousky, 2010). Consequently, policymakers acknowledge the necessity for ﬂood prevention
and protection, and scientists and researchers are currently investigating how and why ﬂooding occurs and who is most negatively
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aﬀected. To this end, researchers seek to understand how people perceive ﬂood risks and what risk management strategies, speci-
ﬁcally ﬂood insurance coverage, governments can implement to reduce the negative consequences of ﬂoods (Birkholz et al., 2014;
Kellens et al., 2013).
In this paper, we analyze experiential, socioeconomic, and sociodemographic characteristics derived from a survey of New
Orleans, Louisiana (United States) residents to predict variation in ﬂood insurance coverage. Understanding why residents have ﬂood
insurance coverage is a signiﬁcant aspect of ﬂood management decision-making and a necessary element for building ﬂood-resilient
communities. Knowledge of ﬂood risk perceptions and of ﬂood insurance coverage can inform ﬂood mitigation policy reform and
government eﬀorts to reduce the social costs of natural hazards, minimize economic losses to households, and improve management
of risks expected to increase due to climate change (Michel-Kerjan and Kousky, 2010). Identifying the major determinants of ﬂood
insurance coverage can assist policymakers in formulating policies and land-use practices to increase resiliency of coastal commu-
nities over the long term.
Our major goal in this paper is to advance scholarly debate on the contradictions of environmental risk management measures
under the conditions of global climate change (Dunlap et al., 2015; Gotham, 2018; 2016a; 2016b; Gotham and Cannon, 2018;
Gotham and Faust, 2019; Harvey, 2016; Müller et al., 2017; Nagel et al., 2010; Mileti, 1999; Tierney, 2014). On the one hand, as a
critical element of ﬂood risk reduction and mitigation, ﬂood insurance provides homeowners with ﬁnancial compensation for re-
building damaged homes (Kousky, 2018; Li and Landry, 2018). On the other hand, federally subsidized ﬂood insurance intensiﬁes
ﬂood risk for homeowners and businesses by encouraging settlement in areas where private insurance would normally not write
policies (Bagstad et al., 2007). The cacophony of state and local tax incentives, subsidies, deductions, and availability of ﬂood
insurance operate in tandem as drivers of real estate development in low-lying riverine and coastal areas, the eﬀect of which reduces
the capacity of hydrological systems to store surface water runoﬀ and thereby contribute to increased vulnerability to ﬂooding. These
developments act in combination with rapid population growth and annual precipitation associated with a subtropical climate to
increase the cost of damages from ﬂooding (Brody et al., 2008; Bagstad et al., 2007). These concerns have motivated researchers to
investigate the ways in which various risk reduction measures can generate contradictions and unforeseen consequences, and ag-
gravate rather than alleviate risk and vulnerability to extreme events.
We ﬁrst describe ﬂood risk management and the evolving challenges faced by the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). Next,
we engage scholarship on ﬂood insurance risk and discuss the factors aﬀecting ﬂood insurance coverage. We then describe the nature
of coastal vulnerability in post-Katrina New Orleans. Next, we explain our sample selection, variable measurement, and data analysis
procedures. We then report results based on binary logistic regression analysis of several socioeconomic, experiential, and socio-
demographic variables. Finally, we interpret our ﬁndings and discuss their policy implications for ﬂood risk management. Today, as
disaster losses mount and ﬂood insurance premiums escalate, communities around the United States face a brave new world of
increased ﬁnancial insecurity and increased vulnerability to ﬂood hazard. As we point out, in ﬂood-prone cities like New Orleans,
ﬂood insurance operates as a double whammy: uninsured or underinsured homes face pervasive risk of both ﬂooding and rising
insurance premiums under the conditions of global climate change.
1.1. Flood risk management and the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)
In 1968, the United States Congress established the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) to reduce property losses from ﬂood
damage and compensate disaster victims. Today, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) administers the program by working with local governments to establish ﬂood insurance rates, regulate ﬂoodplain
development, and advise the public of potential ﬂood hazards (Knowles and Kunreuther, 2014; Nance, 2015; Government
Accountability Oﬃce, 2010). The ﬁnancial management of ﬂood hazards involves (1) funding ﬂood mitigation activities and (2)
delivering federal disaster assistance to individuals, private businesses, and communities to assist in rebuilding destroyed property
and compensate uninsured victims. Those homeowners with mortgages from federally backed or regulated lenders in a 100-year
ﬂoodplain, or a Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA), are federally required to purchase ﬂood insurance. A 100-year ﬂood refers to a
probability and that multiple “100-year” ﬂoods could occur in a row, as in a 1% annual chance of a ﬂood per year. According to King
(2013, p.2), “[f]rom a policymaker’s perspective, the fundamental ﬂood management challenge facing the NFIP is ﬁnding the best
mix of strategies to reduce the nation’s long-term exposure to ﬂood losses while ensuring the program’s solvency and statutory
mandate to provide aﬀordable ﬂood insurance to the general public.”
Since 2005, escalating costs of catastrophic ﬂooding combined with increased payouts for ﬂood damage have imperiled the NFIP.
In August 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused approximately $200 billion in economic losses including $21.9 billion related to
insurance claims under the NFIP. Three years later, in 2008, Hurricane Ike caused roughly $2.7 billion in NFIP claims in coastal areas
of Texas and Louisiana and further inland, many areas not usually subject to tropical rain events. Also, in 2008, widespread ﬂooding
aﬀected more than 11 million people in nine Midwestern states as major rivers in Wisconsin, Nebraska, Missouri, Minnesota,
Michigan, Kansas, Iowa, Indiana, and Illinois overﬂowed their banks and levees (King, 2013). Catastrophic losses from ﬂooding
continued again in 2012 with Hurricane Sandy, and again in 2017 with Hurricanes Harvey, Maria, and Irma.
From its inception in 1968 through 2005, the NFIP was self-suﬃcient, had minimal borrowing authority, and for the most part
was able to pay small principal repayments and accompanying interest expenses. However, cumulative debt increased substantially
from 2005 to 2016. By 2017, the NFIP was $24.6 billion in debt. In 2017–2018, losses from Hurricanes Harvey, Irma and Maria led
the NFIP to borrow $11.9 billion from the U.S. Treasury. After an unprecedented $16 billion cancellation, the NFIP carried $20.5
billion in debt as of December 31, 2017. As designed and implemented, the current program is unable to repay this debt. In FY 2018
alone, the NFIP paid over $375 million of interest expenses (FEMA, NFIP., 2018).
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In short, since 2005, devastating U.S. Gulf Coast and Atlantic hurricanes have brought much attention to and scrutiny of ﬂood
insurance and political debate rages over the sustainability of the NFIP and other ﬂooding mitigation eﬀorts. The long-term future of
the NFIP is uncertain given that Congress has temporarily extended the program 11 times since 2017. Without reauthorization, or
extension, the NFIP would lose the ability to borrow money from the Treasury or issue new contracts. Thus, a major challenge facing
the NFIP is how to reduce the cost of ﬂooding and maintain the program’s ﬁscal sustainability in the face of the increasing de-
structiveness of storms and ﬂooding (FEMA, NFIP., 2018).
Scholars and researchers have voiced several criticisms of the NFIP and have challenged the eﬀectiveness of ﬂood insurance as a
risk mitigation tool. First, residents who have a federally backed mortgage and live in a ﬂoodplain are required to purchase ﬂood
insurance. However, these residents often do not purchase the mandatory insurance coverage. Nationally, only 20 percent of re-
sidents living in ﬂood zone areas have ﬂood insurance, which raises the possibility of high uninsured ﬂood-related losses (FEMA,
2019). Second, individuals tend to misunderstand ﬂood risk, “thinking that after a 100-year ﬂood occurs, they are safe for another
100 years” (King, 2013, p. 3). Social and behavioral scientists have observed that many individuals living in ﬂood-prone areas often
reject low-probability catastrophic events, misunderstand the risk-spreading mechanism of insurance, and overly tend to toward
optimism with respect to the possibility of future ﬂood damage to their property (Kunreuther and Slovic, 1978; Botzen et al., 2009;
Gray‐Scholz et al., 2019). Third, “many at-risk property owners do not think ﬂood insurance is a good investment or opt to ﬁnance
post-disaster reconstruction with federal-disaster assistance, albeit insurance is generally considered the most eﬀective way to ﬁnance
post-disaster recovery” (King, 2013, p. 4).
While some critics argue that the beneﬁts of ﬂood insurance are disproportionately enjoyed by wealthy coastal counties and by
owners of vacation homes (Holladay and Schwartz, 2010), not all beneﬁciaries of the NFIP are wealthy, and NFIP also aﬀect primary
homes. Moreover, many of those who live in vulnerable ﬂood zones do so out of aﬀordability. For them, their NFIP coverage is
indispensable because private ﬂood insurance is either prohibitively expensive or unavailable. In addition, others may be unable to
move because of skyrocketing ﬂood insurance rates, which may make it diﬃcult for them to sell. To address policymakers’ concerns,
a body of research has sought to understand individuals’motivations for purchasing ﬂood insurance (Shao et al., 2017; Browne et al.,
2015; Hung, 2009; Kriesel and Landry, 2004).
1.2. Factors aﬀecting ﬂood insurance coverage
The extent to which individuals understand the consequences of ﬂooding, and the degree to which they regard ﬂooding as
harmful to their well-being, may relate to their personal lifestyle decisions, willingness to support ﬂood risk reduction policy in-
itiatives, and desire to purchase ﬂood insurance as a ﬂood risk mitigation action. Social science research suggests that socioeconomic
and demographic characteristics, such as income, educational attainment, gender, and ethnicity/race, may predict household hazard
adjustments (Brody et al., 2017; Lo, 2013; Peacock et al., 2005; Bubeck et al., 2012; Terpstra and Lindell, 2013). Other research has
examined the impact of ﬂood risk perceptions, past experience with ﬂooding, hazard proximity (geophysical vulnerability to
ﬂooding) on ﬂood insurance purchase (Bubeck et al., 2013; Knowles and Kunreuther, 2014; Kriesel and Landry, 2004).
In a survey of all Gulf Coast counties, Shao et al. (2017) found that that the estimated ﬂood hazard as measured through FEMA
ﬂood maps, the strengths and consequences of past ﬂooding events, and perceived ﬂood-related risks signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced an
individual’s voluntary ﬂood insurance purchase. Flood insurance purchase was also inﬂuenced by home ownership, trust in local
government, educational attainment, and income. In a study of behavioral bias in the demand for insurance, Browne et al. (2015)
found that people tend to prefer insurance for high probability, low consequence risks (HPLC) (i.e., bike theft) over insurance for low
probability, high consequence risks (LPHC) like ﬂooding. Incorporating fuzzy set theory into contingent valuation analysis, Hung
(2009) found that individuals have diﬃculty ascertaining whether or not to buy insurance against low-probability, high loss events.
Her study suggested that perceived levels of ﬂood risk, experience with ﬂooding, and disposable income are important factors in
insurance purchases for individuals.
Previous experience with ﬂooding is another predictor of ﬂood insurance purchase. For the most part, according to Brody and
colleagues (2017, p. 764), “the more recent, frequent, and severe the hazard impacts have been, the more likely a household is to take
protective action.” In their analysis of ﬂood insurance purchases in Georgia from 1978 to 2010, Atreya and colleagues (2015) found
that demand for ﬂood insurance is relatively price inelastic and that recent ﬂood events tend to increase purchases temporarily, but
this eﬀect fades three years after ﬂooding events.
Other studies have found mixed support regarding the assertion that personal experience with hazards leads to support for risk
reduction measures. Howe (2011) and Howe et al. (2013) have noted that the “experience eﬀect” tends to vary according to hazard
context, is not necessarily a predictor of risk perceptions or attitudes toward risk reduction measures, and “may have opposite eﬀects
on risk perception and hazard adjustment depending on the individual and on the circumstances of the experience” (Howe, 2011, p.
714; Halpern-Felsher et al., 2001). Using U.S. public opinion data on support for an array of adaptation policies, Ray et al. (2017)
found that individuals experiencing recent extreme weather events were more likely to support climate change adaptation policy
generally. However, the relationship was modest and inconsistent across speciﬁc climate change adaptation policies. Moreover, eﬀect
of extreme weather activity on opinion diminished over time.
A number of scholars including Laska (1990), Blanchard-Boehm et al. (2001), Browne and Hoyt (2000), Zahran et al. (2006) have
found that ﬂood insurance purchases are correlated with ﬂood experience and ﬂood losses. In a longitudinal analysis of household
survey data before and after a major ﬂood event in Germany (N > 7,400), Osberghaus (2017) found a causal relationship of insured
ﬂood damage on private ﬂood mitigation and a correlated relationship of mitigation and self-reported ﬂood experience. In addition,
Lindell and Hwang (2008) found that though ﬂood experience had an indirect eﬀect on ﬂood insurance purchase, it was mediated by
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risk perception. Other studies suggest that there is no one-to-one correspondence between hazard knowledge, risk perception, and
adoption of risk reduction (mitigation) measures (Bubeck et al., 2012; for an overview, see Kellens et al., 2013).
Over the years, scholars and researchers have studied the eﬀect of hazard proximity on ﬂood insurance coverage. Scholars
recognize that ﬂood insurance coverage does not necessarily relate to objective ﬂood risk measures (base-ﬂood elevation) or geo-
graphical proximity to a ﬂood hazard (National Research Council, 2015). Hazard proximity and hazard prone areas tend to vary in
the recency, frequency, and severity of the ﬂood events they have experienced, all of these characteristics aﬀect ﬂood risk perception
(Lindell and Perry, 2004) and likewise impact decisions to reduce risks (e.g., purchase ﬂood insurance). In their study of the re-
lationship between erosion risk and ﬂood insurance demand, Landry and Jahan-Parvar (2011) found that ﬂood insurance coverage
was positively correlated with erosion near shorelines for properties in active erosion zones. Lindell and Hwang (2008) evidence
proximity to inland ﬂood as well as coastal hurricane hazards was signiﬁcantly correlated to ﬂood insurance purchase even after
controlling for demographic and household characteristics.
Other research has found that there is no direct relationship between environmental hazard proximity and environmental risk
perceptions (see, for example Arlikatti et al., 2006; Zhang et al., 2004). Brody et al. (2017) conclude that “the physical proximity of a
respondent to ﬂood hazard areas makes little or no discernible diﬀerence in the decision to obtain ﬂood insurance.” Hazard proximity
can mean diﬀerent things to diﬀerent people. Research by Zhang et al., 2010, p. 600) contends that “many people cannot accurately
identify their home’s location on a risk-area map.” Ludy and Kondolf’s (2012, p. 1) survey of residents living in a 100-year ﬂood plain
“protected” by a levee found that respondents “did not understand the risk of being ﬂooded”. Moreover, homeowners living in ﬂood
hazard-prone areas can vary in how they interpret the validity of ﬂood information and the credibility of the sources that disseminate
risk information, such as authorities, news media, or peers (families, friends, neighbors, or coworkers) (Arlikatti et al., 2007).
Extant scholarship suggests that trust—or lack of trust—in government oﬃcials and experts can inﬂuence peoples’ decisions to
engage in risk mitigation behaviors (e.g., purchase ﬂood insurance) (Kellens et al., 2013; Slovic, 2000; Botzen et al., 2015;
Whitmarsh, 2008). Early survey research by Slovic et al. (1991) found that if individuals distrust the ability of U.S. government
agencies to adequately manage risks of hazardous facilities, they are likely to perceive the risk of hazardous facilities to be high.
Terpstra (2011) more recently has found similar eﬀects of trust on individual ﬂood risk perceptions. Terpstra (2011) notes that
individuals who trust local government’s risk management capability are less likely to undertake protective measures, since they
believe that they have a low likelihood of ﬂooding (see also Botzen et al., 2015). Hung (2009) found that trust in public ﬂood
protection (levees, dikes, etc.) was negatively related to insurance purchase insurance. Lin et al. (2008) reported that higher levels of
trust in crisis management and delivery of ﬂood warnings by government, risk experts, and media increased insurance purchase
intentions.
Wachinger et al. (2013) suggest caution in interpreting ﬁndings related to trust, risk perceptions, and individual decisions to
undertake risk mitigation actions like purchasing insurance. Contextual and situational factors can inﬂuence how an individual
interprets risk information and uses this information to make decisions regarding insurance purchase. Moreover, trust has diﬀerent
meanings for diﬀerent people. People can have trust in local authorities but not federal authorities to protect them from hazards.
They can also have diﬀerent views of the protective aspects of risk control structures (levees, dikes). In addition, their experience with
hazards can inﬂuence levels of trust.
1.3. Coastal vulnerability and the case of post-Katrina New Orleans
During Hurricane Katrina, in August 2005, multiple failures in the levee system maintained by the Army Corp of Engineers
ﬂooded 80 percent of New Orleans and damaged over 200,000 homes. The ensuing destruction triggered by the levee collapse killed
more than 1,400 Louisiana residents and displaced more than a million others. Since 2007, federal, state, and local governments have
worked to construct, repair, and upgrade over 160 miles of levees in response to the tragedy. For instance, the Greater New Orleans
Hurricane and Storm Damage Risk Reduction System (HSDRRS) received $14.5 billion in federal and state investments to further
elevate levee and ﬂoodwall protections, build a new surge barrier, install new pumping stations, and to develop canal closures
(Gotham, 2018). Despite these ﬂood protection improvements, ﬂooding remains a constant threat to the area and a major source of
worry and insecurity for residents (Gotham, 2018). The threat of ﬂooding is expected to grow as extreme events – seasonal rain and
hurricanes – become more frequent and destructive due to global warming and sea level rise (IPCC, 2014).
In short, the New Orleans area is the “canary in the coal mine” when it comes to climate change ﬂood risk in the United States.
Scientists view the region as a harbinger of things to come for coastal ecosystems worldwide under the threat of rising sea levels and
global climate change (Kent, 2012; Wang et al., 2011). Currently, planners and policy makers debate various policies to reduce
coastal ﬂood risk, and major coastal restoration projects and climate change adaptation and mitigation eﬀorts are currently underway
(Gotham and Faust, 2019; Peyronnin et al., 2013; Fischbach et al., 2012).
In this paper, we investigate the factors motivating people to buy ﬂood insurance. The U.S. Gulf Coast has some of the lowest ﬂood
insurance take-up rates in the country with an estimated 24.9% for all counties along the Gulf Coast. Louisiana coastal counties alone
have a take-up rate of 16.18% on average (FEMA, 2018). Orleans Parish, the county of New Orleans, has a slightly larger take-up rate
of 20.74% (FEMA, 2018). These concerns underpin the need to examine the linkages among ﬂood risk perceptions, socio-demo-
graphic characteristics, and ﬂood insurance coverage more closely.
Based on the extant literature, we test the following hypotheses:
H1: Flood insurance coverage is expected to be positively correlated with age, educational attainment, income, employment
status, and homeownership.
H2: Residents with ﬂood insurance coverage are more likely to have lived in a residence damaged by ﬂooding.
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H3: Residents with low trust in government oﬃcials’ ability to protect their household from ﬂooding will be more likely to have
ﬂood insurance coverage.
2. Methods and data analysis
In this study, we analyze ﬁndings from a survey of New Orleans residents conducted during March to May 2016, consisting of a
four-page questionnaire of scaled questions regarding diﬀerent hazards, ﬂood risk perceptions, and ﬂood insurance coverage. The
survey was pretested with 12 residents and professionals living in the region. Incorporating their feedback, we eliminated redundant
questions and distilled questions and response categories for clarity. The structured questionnaire contained 18 close-ended questions
that asked about perceptions of ﬂood risk, rodent and mosquito disease risk, and individual-level variables including ﬂood insurance
coverage, race/ethnicity, gender, age, education, homeownership status, and socioeconomic variables. Respondents were also asked
about their previous experiences with storms and ﬂooding, and concerns apropos future threats to safety.
All four authors of this study delivered surveys door to door to 1,944 randomly selected households located in the neighborhoods
of Bywater, Gentilly, Lakeshore, Lakeview, Lower Ninth Ward, Upper Ninth Ward, and Uptown. Survey sampling paralleled a net-
work of 72 plots where vegetation and ecological surveys were completed by other research team members funded through a
National Science Foundation (NSF) Coupled Natural-Human (CNH) Systems grant. To guarantee a minimum number of respondents
per neighborhood for comparative analysis we sampled the same number of households in each neighborhood. In each neighborhood,
we distributed a survey to 278 randomly selected addresses.
Recruitment materials and survey questions were printed in English. The adult in a household with the most recent birthday was
asked to participate in the study. Respondents were asked to complete the four-page survey and return it to researchers in an
enclosed, stamped envelope. Through June 2016, we received 403 returned surveys for a response rate of 20.73%.
To evaluate the predictors of ﬂood insurance coverage, we asked respondents to report whether they had ﬂood insurance, did not
have ﬂood insurance, or did not know whether they had ﬂood insurance at their current residence.
Table 1 shows the characteristics and frequency distributions of survey respondents.
We used a binary logistic regression model to determine the impact of ﬂood experience, length of residency, sociodemographic
and socioeconomic variables, and social trust in oﬃcials on ﬂood insurance coverage. Mathematically, our logistic regression esti-
mates a multiple linear regression function deﬁned as:
=
+
+ + + +
+ + +
P Y e
e
( )
1
b b x b x b x
b b x b x b x
...
...
n n
n n
0 1 1 2 2
0 1 1 2 2
In this equation, P is the probability of Y occurring; e is the natural logarithm base; b0 is the interception at y-axis; b1 is the line
gradient; bn is the regression coeﬃcient of Xn; and Xn are the predictor variables.
In our analysis, the independent variables included whether a residence had been damaged by ﬂood, perception of ﬂood pro-
tection for the city and their home, trust in local, state, and federal oﬃcials, gender, education level, household income, employment
status, housing status (e.g., renter or homeowner), age of respondent, and race. The assumption of linearity and independence of
residuals, as assessed by a Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.78, was met. We ran a series of regression models to assess collinearity
diagnostics and results showed no issues with multicollinearity in the models. The assumption that the model no unusual points was
met (+−3); the assumption of no residuals was met (+−2.6); there were no leverage values above the accepted threshold value of
0.2; there were no Cook’s distance values above 1; and residuals were normally distributed.
More precisely, we ran a series of cumulative-odds binary logistic regression with proportional odds to determine the eﬀect of our
independent variables on respondents’ ﬂood insurance coverage. This is an appropriate estimation technique given the dependent
variable is binary (i.e., ﬂood insurance coverage or not). This analytic technique is appropriate given logistic binary regression does
not require assumptions of multivariate normality, linearity and homogeneity of variance for independent variables and equal
variance-covariance across groups. One advantage of binary logistic regression over OLS regression is that independent variables can
be treated as categorical. Independent variables with categories were speciﬁed as such and the models specify the last category of a
variable as the referent. Moreover, the logistic regression provides odds ratios, which help elucidate likelihood (Osborn, 2014).
2.1. Survey results
Table 2 presents the parameter estimates of the binary logistic regression model predicting social demographics and length of
residency on ﬂood insurance. The chi-square, which indicates goodness-of-ﬁt indicates that the model was a good ﬁt to the observed
data, X2 (403) = 178.778 (p < 0.001). There are several statistics that estimate variance for the models that show strength of
association between the dependent variable and predictor variables in this analysis. To determine how well the model explains
variation in the dependent variable, we calculated Cox and Snell (0.41) and Nagelkerek (0.6) pseudo R2 measures. Both pseudo R2
statistics refer to the squared correlation between the observed and predicted values of the outcome variable. Generally, and similar
to R2 in OLS regression, the higher the pseudo R2, the better the model is speciﬁed (see table note for more information on pseudo
R2).
When controlling for all other variables, for those who identiﬁed their income as being in the less than $20,000 category there is a
decrease in respondents’ likelihood to have ﬂood insurance. Similarly respondents in the income categories, $20,000 to $34,999,
$35,000 to $49,999, $50,000 to $74,999, had a decreased likelihood of having ﬂood insurance when compared to those who reported
income of $200,000 or more. Respondents between the ages of 45 and 74 were signiﬁcantly more likely than those aged 75 and over
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Table 1
Characteristics of Survey Respondents.
Variable (N = 403) N %
Dependent variable
Flood insurance coverage
Yes 306 75.9
No 93 23.1
Independent variables
Income
Less than $20,000 47 11.7
$20,000 to $34,999 30 7.4
$35,000 to $49,999 30 7.4
$50,000 to $74,999 54 13.4
$75,000 to $99,999 42 10.4
$100,000 to $149,999 60 14.9
$150,000 to $199,999 40 9.9
$200,000 or more 84 15.9
Sex
Female 244 60.5
Male 150 37.2
Age
18–24 5 1.2
25–34 34 8.4
35–44 59 14.6
45–54 74 18.4
55–64 115 28.5
65–74 77 19.1
75 or older 37 9.2
Racial group
White 300 74.4
Hispanic/Latino 4 1.0
African America/black 71 17.6
Native American 1 0.2
Asian/Paciﬁc Islander 7 1.7
Other 8 2.0
Educational level
Less than high school 5 1.2
High school graduate or equivalent 46 11.4
Trade or technical school 32 7.9
College graduate 146 36.2
Graduate degree 168 41.7
Employment Full Time
Yes 222 55.1
No 179 44.4
Housing status
Homeowner 326 80.9
Renter 71 17.6
Neighborhood ﬂooded during Hurricane Katrina
Yes 199 49.4
No 203 50.4
Residence damaged by ﬂood caused by hurricane
Yes 229 56.8
No 174 43.2
Residence damaged by ﬂood not caused by hurricane
Yes 86 21.3
No 316 78.4
Perception of ﬂood protection for the city
About the same as before Hurricane Katrina 94 23.3
Worse now than before Hurricane Katrina 13 3.2
Unsure/Do not Know 52 12.9
Better now than before Hurricane Katrina (reference) 242 60
Perception that levee system will protect home from ﬂooding
Very unlikely 13 3.2
Unlikely 34 8.4
Unsure/Don’t know 115 28.5
Likely 163 40.4
Very likely (Reference) 78 19.4
Perception that levee system will protect the city from ﬂooding
Very unlikely 11 2.7
Unlikely 79 19.6
Unsure/Don’t Know 153 38
(continued on next page)
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Table 1 (continued)
Variable (N = 403) N %
Likely 131 32.5
Very likely (reference) 29 7.2
Trust in local oﬃcials to protect the city from ﬂooding
Strongly disagree 43 10.7
Disagree 121 30
Neutral/No opinion 105 26.1
Agree 114 28.3
Strongly Agree 18 4.5
Trust in state oﬃcials to protect the city from ﬂooding
Strongly disagree 46 11.4
Disagree 142 35.2
Neutral/No opinion 111 27.5
Agree 91 22.6
Strongly Agree 11 2.7
Trust in federal oﬃcials to protect the city from ﬂooding
Strongly disagree 46 11.4
Disagree 142 35.2
Neutral/No opinion 111 27.5
Agree 91 22.6
Strongly Agree 11 2.7
Trust in Army Corp of Engineers to protect the city from ﬂooding
Strongly disagree 77 19.1
Disagree 103 25.6
Neutral/No opinion 98 24.3
Agree 106 26.3
Strongly Agree 14 3.5
Table 2
Parameter Estimates of Binary Logistic Regression Model Predicting Eﬀects of Social Demographics and Length of Residency on Flood Insurance,
Controlling for Sociodemographic Variables.
Parameter Estimates B Std. Error Wald Exp. (B) 95% CI Lower Upper
Income
Less than $20,000 −3.513 0.995 12.468 0.03*** 0.004 0.21
$20,000 to $34,999 −2.927 1.042 7.889 0.054** 0.007 0.413
$35,000 to $49,999 −2.207 1.011 4.786 0.11* 0.015 0.798
$50,000 to $74,999 −2.598 0.91 8.144 0.074** 0.012 0.443
$75,000 to $99,999 −1.108 0.95 1.36 0.33 0.051 2.126
$100,000 to $149,999 −0.71 0.947 0.562 0.492 0.077 3.145
$150,000 to $199,999 −1.156 0.968 1.425 0.315 0.047 2.1
$200,000 or more (referent)
Female 0.405 0.402 1.017 1.5 0.682 3.297
Age
18-24a −16.125 15608.832 0.000 0.000 0.000 –
25–34 0.537 0.879 0.373 1.711 0.306 9.577
35–44 0.779 0.802 0.944 2.180 0.452 10.505
45–54 1.626 0.767 4.488 5.083* 1.129 22.873
55–64 1.196 0.631 3.594 3.306† 0.96 11.377
65–74 2.033 0.698 8.474 7.638** 1.943 30.027
75 or older (reference)
Racial group
White −0.964 1.343 0.515 0.381 0.027 5.302
Hispanic/Latinoa 35.917 24590.354 0.000 – 0.000 –
African America/black −1.221 1.366 0.799 0.295 0.02 4.291
Native Americana 17.783 40192.969 0.000 – 0.000 –
Asian/Paciﬁc Islander 0.584 2.327 0.063 1.793 0.019 171.463
Other (reference group)
Educational level 0.471 0.208 5.119 1.602* 1.065 2.408
Employment 0.483 0.51 0.898 1.622 0.597 4.407
Renter −2.956 0.482 37.695 0.052*** 0.02 0.134
Neighborhood ﬂooded during Hurricane Katrina 1.4 0.5 7.847 4.055** 1.523 10.8
Constant −1.227 1.938 0.401 0.293
† p < 0.1
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
a The sample size was so low that the values computed are uninterpretable.
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to have ﬂood insurance coverage. Note that the age group 55–64 was statistically signiﬁcant at p < 0.1. Age categories 45–54 and
65–74 were statistically signiﬁcant at least at the p < 0.05 level of signiﬁcance. The higher the educational level the greater the
likelihood that a respondent has ﬂood insurance coverage. Lastly, we found that if a respondent’s neighborhood had ﬂooded during
Hurricane Katrina, they have an increased likelihood of having ﬂood insurance coverage. Neighborhood ﬂooded in Hurricane Katrina
was the most robust predictor of whether or not respondents currently have ﬂood insurance coverage. Sex, racial or ethnic group, and
employment were not found to be statistically signiﬁcant determinants of ﬂood insurance.
Table 3 shows the parameter estimates and overall results of the binary logistic regression model predicting eﬀects of experiences
of ﬂooding, perception of ﬂood protection, and social trust on ﬂood insurance, when controlling for the sociodemographic char-
acteristics of respondents (N = 403). The chi-square indicates goodness-of-ﬁt and shows that the model was a good ﬁt to the observed
data, X2 (403) = 59.488 (p < 0.01). Our model has a Cox and Snell of 0.141 Nagelkerke R2 of 0.226.
When controlling for all other variables, for respondents who have lived in a residence damaged by a ﬂood caused by a hurricane
there is an increased likelihood that a respondent will have ﬂood insurance when compared to those without such an experience. For
Table 3
Parameter Estimates of Binary Logistic Regression Model Predicting Eﬀects of Experiential, Perception, and Social Trust Variables on Flood
Insurance, Controlling for Sociodemographic Variables.
Parameter Estimates B Std. Error Wald Exp. (B) 95% CI Lower Upper
Residence damaged by ﬂood caused by hurricane 1.051 0.3 12.297 2.86*** 1.59 5.146
Residence damaged by ﬂood not caused by hurricane 0.126 0.381 0.11 1.135 0.538 2.393
Perception of ﬂood protection for the city
About the same as before Hurricane Katrina 0.487 0.424 1.32 1.628 0.709 3.737
Worse now than before Hurricane Katrina 1.796 0.782 5.273 6.024* 1.301 27.895
Unsure/Do not Know 0.308 0.49 0.394 1.361 0.52 3.558
Better now than before Hurricane Katrina (reference)
Perception that levee system will protect home from ﬂooding
Very unlikely 0.842 0.962 0.768 2.322 0.353 15.292
Unlikely -0.943 0.844 1.247 0.39 0.074 2.038
Unsure/Don’t know 0.452 0.551 0.671 1.571 0.533 4.629
Likely 0.01 0.491 0.000 1.01 0.386 2.645
Very likely (Reference)
Perception that levee system will protect the city from ﬂooding
Very unlikely -0.482 1.158 0.173 0.617 0.064 5.98
Unlikely 0.334 0.783 0.181 1.396 0.301 6.479
Unsure/Don’t Know 0.126 0.697 0.033 1.134 0.289 4.446
Likely -0.824 0.722 1.301 0.439 0.107 1.807
Very likely (reference)
Trust in local oﬃcials to protect the city from ﬂooding
Strongly disagree 0.165 1.327 0.015 1.179 0.088 15.887
Disagree -0.627 1.177 0.284 0.534 0.053 5.369
Neutral/No opinion 0.148 1.172 0.016 1.159 0.117 11.525
Agree -0.750 1.175 0.407 0.472 0.047 4.728
Strongly Agree (reference)
Trust in state oﬃcials to protect the city from ﬂooding
Strongly disagree -0.409 1.158 0.069 0.665 0.031 14.09
Disagree -0.19 1.41 0.018 0.827 0.052 13.121
Neutral/No opinion -0.187 1.421 0.017 0.829 0.051 13.444
Agree 0.404 1.427 0.08 1.497 0.091 24.544
Strongly Agree (reference)
Trust in federal oﬃcials to protect the city from ﬂooding
Strongly disagree −2.349 0.921 6.509 0.095* 0.016 0.58
Disagree −1.398 0.828 2.846 0.247† 0.049 1.254
Neutral/No opinion −1.788 0.835 4.589 0.167* 0.033 0.859
Agree −1.406 0.838 2.814 0.245† 0.047 1.267
Strongly Agree (reference)
Trust in Army Corp of Engineers to protect the city from ﬂooding
Strongly disagree 1.358 1.037 1.713 3.887 0.509 29.687
Disagree 1.307 0.964 1.841 3.696 0.559 24.428
Neutral/No opinion 0.898 0.963 0.87 2.456 0.372 16.221
Agree 0.545 0.952 0.328 1.725 0.267 11.139
Strongly Agree (reference)
Constant -0.278 0.979 0.081 0.757
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
† p < 0.1.
Note: Odds ratios are reported for all logistic regression tables. Odds ratios are estimated to the nearest thousand. The results include pseudo-R2
even though statisticians disagree over the usefulness of this measure of goodness of ﬁt. Therefore, the low R2 should not be taken as indicative of
incomplete or inaccurate models (see Ramseyer and Rasmusen 2010). One measure of goodness of ﬁt that can be used is the proportioned by chance
accuracy rate—that is does the model estimate the model correctly 25% better than chance. These models meet these criteria.
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perception variables, respondents who perceive that ﬂood protection for the city is worse now than before Hurricane Katrina have an
increased likelihood to have ﬂood insurance. Respondents who expressed this concern are six times more likely than respondents who
expressed that ﬂood protection is better now than before Hurricane Katrina to have ﬂood insurance.
Interestingly, respondents who strongly disagree that they can trust federal oﬃcials to protect the city from ﬂooding had a
decreased likelihood of having ﬂood insurance compared to those that strongly agree that they trust federal oﬃcials. Respondents
who reported agreeing that they can trust federal oﬃcials to protect the city from ﬂooding have a decreased likelihood of having
ﬂood insurance compared to those that strongly agree. Those that reported feeling neutral or having no opinion on federal oﬃcials
also have a decreased likelihood of having ﬂood insurance compared to those that strongly agree. Experience of a residence damaged
by ﬂood not cause by a hurricane, perception of the levee system protections, and trust in local and state oﬃcials were not statistically
signiﬁcant determinants of ﬂood insurance coverage.
We wish to note that the lack of statistical signiﬁcance for experience of a residence damaged by ﬂood not caused by a hurricane is
curious and interesting. The majority of ﬂood damage insurance claims have historically come from ﬂood damage from nuisance
ﬂooding (ﬂoods that occur outside of hurricane season which runs from June 1 to November 30). Nuisance ﬂooding—which causes
public inconveniences such as repeated road closures, inundated storm drains and compromised infrastructure—has increased on
average by about 50 percent over the last 20 years and 100 percent over the last 30 years in the U.S.. Many coastal U.S. cities already
face the omnipresence of nuisance ﬂooding. Continued sea level rise is expected to increase the frequency, depth and extent of
nuisance ﬂoods, with some parts of Louisiana’s coast potentially seeing daily ﬂooding by 2100 according to a 2018 report by the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (Sweet et al., 2018). Our ﬁndings suggest that residents may not be aware
of the damaging impacts of nuisance ﬂooding. Over time, nuisance ﬂooding can degrade drainage and sewer systems, contaminate
drinking water supplies, and damage buildings.
3. Discussion
The above ﬁndings oﬀer partial support for our stated hypotheses. For hypothesis 1, our ﬁndings suggest that only age and income
were statistically signiﬁcant predictors of ﬂood insurance coverage. As expected, older, wealthier homeowners were more likely to
have ﬂood insurance coverage, a ﬁnding that is consistent with extant literature on ﬂood insurance coverage (Brody et al., 2017).
This ﬁnding also corroborates environmental justice literature that ﬁnds household income to be a predictor of environmental hazard
risk perceptions (Eisenman et al., 2007; Finch et al., 2010; Brulle and Pellow, 2006). Given prior research linking home ownership to
greater ﬂood risk perception (Burningham et al., 2008; Grothmann and Reusswig, 2006), we ﬁnd that homeowners are more likely
than renters to have ﬂood insurance. We do not ﬁnd race/ethnicity or gender to be a statistically signiﬁcant predictor of ﬂood
insurance coverage. We did ﬁnd education to have the expected eﬀect, based on extant literature, of being positively associated with
ﬂood insurance coverage.
Additionally, we found support for our second hypothesis that previous experiences of ﬂooding correlate with the likelihood of
current ﬂood insurance coverage. Importantly, we found that if a respondents’ neighborhood had ﬂooded during Hurricane Katrina,
they were four times as likely as someone whose neighborhood had not ﬂooded to have ﬂood insurance. The literature on decision-
making concerning risk perception and risk mitigation action suggests that individuals that have experienced a major disaster or
traumatic event may underestimate the likelihood of a low-probability event if they have not experienced it and overestimate its
likelihood if they have experienced the event (Hertwig et al., 2004; Fox and Hadar, 2006) and overestimate its likelihood (Brilly and
Polic, 2005; Ruin et al., 2007; Siegrist and Gutscher, 2006; Viscusi and Zeckhauser, 2006). Researchers explain this behavior as
availability bias (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) and note that individuals who have recently experienced a ﬂood, for example, may
ﬁnd it easier to imagine that a ﬂood in the future will happen and therefore take actions to mitigate the risk.
Scholars and researchers have long known that trust—or lack of trust—in government oﬃcials can have a substantial impact on
risk perception and risk mitigation action (Wachinger et al., 2013; Atreya et al., 2015; Shao et al., 2017). To test this assertion, we
included questions related to experiences of ﬂooding and to perceptions of social trust in oﬃcials at local, state, and federal gov-
ernment and the Army Crop of Engineers. We found that those who perceive ﬂood protections to be worse now than before Hurricane
Katrina, are signiﬁcantly more likely to have ﬂood insurance compared to those who perceive ﬂood protections to be better now.
Such perceptions point to the importance of reliable and accurate information on the eﬀorts of oﬃcials and policymakers to ensure
the utmost precautions are taken to protect residents from ﬂooding. This ﬁnding gives credence to the importance of studying the
protection eﬀorts, themselves, and communicating these results to the public in an accessible way (Kammerbauer and Minnery,
2019). Doing so may reduce perceptions that residents and neighborhoods are not well protected against ﬂooding. This ﬁnding also
indicates that people are more likely to protect their own interests through ﬂood insurance coverage in light of their perception that
local government lacks proper ﬂooding protections.
We believe that the lack of support for race/ethnicity and gender as predictors of ﬂood insurance coverage can be explained by
what Wachinger et al. (2013) call the “Risk Perception Paradox” which is the belief that high risk perceptions will lead to risk
mitigation behavior. Researchers have found that high risk perceptions do not necessarily translate into behaviors that reduce risks.
Across a wide array of risks, involving climate change, disaster events, and hazards, such as volcanoes, earthquakes, and ﬂoods,
research has found that women and racial and ethnic minorities tend to express higher risk perceptions than men and whites (Bord
and O’Connor, 1997; Davidson and Freudenburg, 1996; Finucane et al., 2000; Fothergill, 1996; Fothergill and Peek, 2004; Gotham,
2014; Kellens et al., 2011; Ludy and Kondolf, 2012; Marshall, 2004; Marshall et al., 2006; McCright, 2010; Perry and Lindell, 2008;
Senkbeil et al., 2014; Slovic, 2001; Vaughn and Nordenstam, 1991; Vaughn and Seifert, 1992). The intersection of race/ethnicity and
gender in risk perception ﬁndings has also been noted in the literature but scholars recognize that the relationship between race/
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ethnicity and gender and risk mitigation behavior can nuanced and complex. While race/ethnicity and gender may not play a direct
role in predicting risk mitigation behavior, these factors could act as mediators or ampliﬁers of the main causal connections between
experience, perception, and preparedness to take protective actions.
We can also interpret these ﬁndings with respect to the changing nature of ﬂood insurance in post-Katrina New Orleans. The
passage of the Biggert-Waters Act in 2012, originally intended to strengthen the future ﬁnancial solvency and administrative eﬃ-
ciency of the NFIP, has endangered the aﬀordability of ﬂood insurance for many residents. The Act eliminated insurance premium
subsidies on severe repetitive loss properties (SRL) and on properties that have incurred ﬂood-related damage that has exceeded the
fair market value of the property, among other reforms. SRLs are those properties that NFIP has paid at least two claims of more than
$1,000 in a 10-year period since 1978. At 7,223 such properties, Louisiana has considerably more SRLs than any other state with
damages adding up to $1.22 billion between 1978 and 2015 (Natural Resource Defense Council (NRDC), 2017) (see Table 4). The Act
has also gradually phased in actuarial rates for structures newly mapped into special ﬂood hazard areas and legislated increases in the
annual cap on ﬂood insurance premium rate increases from 10% to 20%.
Thus, the Biggert-Waters Act has hit Louisiana especially hard and has exacerbated community uncertainty regarding what parts
of New Orleans are at high risk of seeing spikes in the cost of ﬂood insurance. In some neighborhoods, FEMA is asking homeowners to
consider elevating their homes in place, a situation that has caused neighborhood disruption as some homeowners cannot aﬀord to
raise their home but cannot sell their home because the high cost of ﬂood insurance can deter potential homebuyers. These points
dovetail with Elliott’s (2017; 2019) observation that ﬂood insurance is not just about guarding against ﬂood damage. Rather, ﬂood
insurance is about “values at risk” to the extent that it ensnarls communities in complicated conversations about threat and risk,
ﬁnancial and social values, property loss, and existential security. Because homeownership underpins economic security and wealth
creation in the United States, changes to ﬂood insurance are highly consequential for the near- and long-term economic security of
individuals and communities.
4. Conclusion
We consider our study as a starting point for investigating relationships among experiential, socioeconomic, and socio-
demographic factors in the determination of ﬂood insurance coverage. Our ﬁndings must be considered in light of several limitations
of the current study. First, the study is cross-sectional, therefore temporal ordering of variables cannot be veriﬁed with certainty.
Future work using a longitudinal research design could track insurance purchase decisions over time and compare coverage rates
across diﬀerent base ﬂood elevations and land-uses. Such a design could address how and why questions concerning homeowner
decisions to purchase ﬂood insurance and then discontinue these policies after a period of time (see Osberghaus, 2017). Second, the
study is non-experimental and as such we did not include speciﬁc interventions to compare across an experiment and control group.
To test causal relations, we need (quasi) experimental and longitudinal designs (Trumbo et al., 2014; Kellens et al., 2013). Third, our
survey was restricted to seven neighborhoods in New Orleans and ﬁndings therefore are not generalizable to the entire city.
Fourth, the inability for expected demographic characteristics to be statistically signiﬁcant may be the result of the small sample
size of each demographic group and the low response rate (20%). Mail-return surveys tend to have low response rates compared to
other kinds of surveys (see Dillman et al., 2014). Other environmental risk survey studies have had higher and lower response rates
and research has shown that low response rates do not necessarily bias or weaken the signiﬁcance of the ﬁndings (see for instance
Van Duinen et al., 2015; Terpstra and Lindell, 2013). Brody and colleagues (2017, p. 773) suggest that large samples could “provide a
sounder basis for proposing and testing multi-stage, multi-equation models that more explicitly model the mediating mechanisms that
intervene between exogenous variables such as hazard proximity and house value, on the hand, and the ultimate endogenous variable
– ﬂood insurance purchase.” Moreover, the addition of other socioeconomic and sociodemographic variables, and individual and
context level factors to the models may provide further insights into insurance purchase decisions.
As in other ﬂood prone cities, ﬂood insurance has paradoxical and contradictory eﬀects since it is a policy that both intensiﬁes risk
and mitigates risk. On the one hand, ﬂood insurance plays an important role in risk reduction by mitigating economic losses and
providing ﬁnancial support in the event of ﬂooding. These points dovetail with the work of Müller and colleagues (2017) who note,
using the example of agriculture insurance in developing countries, that insurance can be an important tool for mitigating the impacts
of climate change, but it “needs to be carefully developed with speciﬁc local social-ecological contexts and existing risk coping
strategies in mind. Otherwise, it is liable to create long-term maladaptive outcomes and undermine the ability of these systems to
reduce vulnerability.” Like agricultural insurance programs in both developing and developed countries, ﬂood insurance coverage in
Table 4
States with Severe Repetitive Loss (SRL) Properties.
State Number of SRL Properties Total Damages (1978–2015)
Louisiana 7,223 $1.22 billion
Texas 4,889 $0.96 billion
New Jersey 3,246 $0.66 billion
New York 1,802 $0.40 billion
Florida 1,601 $0.37 billion
Missouri 1,526 $0.19 billion
Source: National Resources Defense Council (2017).
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the United States shapes land-use decisions and can generate economic, social, and ecological consequences.
In the United States, researchers and scholars have long known that ﬂood insurance can encourage real estate development in
ﬂood plains and coastal areas and thereby increase the vulnerability of homeowners and businesses to ﬂood damage (Bagstad et al.,
2007). Moreover, the NFIP is the major source of ﬂood insurance in the U.S. but it is in debt by more than $20 billion, having
borrowed approximately $40 billion from the government since Hurricane Katrina. Congress designed the Biggert–Waters Flood
Insurance Reform Act of 2012 to phase out subsidies in high risk ﬂood areas and raise ﬂood insurance premiums. FEMA requires the
majority of homeowners with mortgages living in certain designated areas to purchase ﬂood insurance. There are many neighbor-
hoods across the U.S. that are vulnerable to ﬂooding but where insurance is not mandatory and many residents choose not to enroll
there are at times dire consequences. Moreover, rising premiums in many neighborhoods in the United States have spurred mobi-
lizations of residents to challenge what they see as the double whammy of ﬂood insurance: uninsured or underinsured homes face
pervasive risk of both ﬂooding and rising insurance premiums under the conditions of global climate change.
Going forward, policy makers will face major ﬂood management challenges in their attempts to shore up the ﬁnancial sustain-
ability of the NFIP in the context of expected future extreme weather events, sea-level rise, and coastal ﬂooding. While storms and
rising sea levels may threaten coastal communities, it could be that rising ﬂood insurance premiums may play a larger role in making
some places no longer livable in their current form. Scholars and researchers should probe controversies over climate justice debates
pertaining to distributions, procedures, rights, responsibilities and recognition at a subnational scale (Bulkeley et al., 2013; Bulkeley
et al., 2014; Broto, 2017). In addition, hurricane damage increasingly exposes the federal government to escalating insurance payouts
and budget liabilities (Government Accountability Oﬃce, 2019). The Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2016) suggests that, over time,
the costs associated with hurricane damage will increase faster than the economy will grow. Thus, evolving grassroots and policy
understandings of climate change risk will shape and be shaped in part by political debates on the aﬀordability of ﬂood insurance and
government deﬁnitions of ﬂood risk.
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